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Abstract In this paper, I propose a solution to Fitch’s paradox that draws on ideas
from Edgington (Mind 94:557–568, 1985), Rabinowicz and Segerberg (1994) and
Kvanvig (Nouˆs 29:481–500, 1995). After examining the solution strategies of these
authors, I will defend the view, initially proposed by Kvanvig, according to which
the derivation of the paradox violates a crucial constraint on quantifier instantiation.
The constraint states that non-rigid expressions cannot be substituted into modal po-
sitions. We will introduce a slightly modified syntax and semantics that will help
underline this point. Furthermore, we will prove results about the consistency of
verificationism and the principle of non-omniscience by model-theoretical means.
Namely, we prove there exists a model of these principles, and delineate certain
constraints they pose on a structure in which they are true.
Keywords Fitch’s paradox · Modal scope · Possible worlds semantics
1 Why the Paradox Matters
Why is Fitch’s paradox a problem in the first place? Conventional wisdom has it
that a paradox is when an unexpected consequence follows from assumptions ini-
tially believed to be valid. But if one is of the prior conviction, as I am, that truth
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outpaces knowability, that there are in fact unknowable true propositions, then why
should we consider Fitch’s paradox paradoxical at all? Edgington [6] is of the opin-
ion that “[e]ven an out-and-out realist should [...] suspect that the long philosophical
tradition to which he is opposed cannot be so swiftly reduced to absurdity”, and I
whole heartedly agree with her assessment.1 The problem in this paradox, as I see it,
is not so much in the thesis of verificationism itself, but rather in the way in which
a contradiction is derived from it. My informed opinion that verificationism is false
is arrived at only by assuming many things about truth, knowledge and the world.
The puzzling thing in Fitch’s paradox is that none of these assumptions are required
to arrive at the same conclusion.2 This is where suspicions arise. It isn’t that I be-
lieve verificationism to be a contingent thesis. It could be that those facts about truth
and knowledge that make verificationism false could also hold in many other worldly
configurations. But to think that verificationism is false for basic logical reasons
alone is slightly over the top. That, I think, is why we should care. Fitch’s paradox is
showing us that something has gone awry in our formalism and/or our understand-
ing of it. Incidentally, this puts me at odds with a very influential interpretation of
the paradox defended by Timothy Williamson. His view is that Fitch’s paradox es-
tablishes limits intrinsic to our knowledge, limits that are structural for “they do not
depend on our contingent computational limitations or the contingent causal struc-
ture of space-time[, t]hey arise whenever we are ignorant at all.” ([18]: 270). I find
this conclusion highly implausible, and I believe this paper will go a long way in
showing why.3
The idea that the formalism is to blame in the paradox has been explored by many
philosophers already. Edgington [6] was one of the first authors to propose an anal-
ysis and solution of this kind. Other figures include Rabinowicz and Segerberg [11],
Kvanvig [8] and Brogaard and Salerno [2].4 In this paper, I would like to propose
a solution to Fitch’s paradox that draws on the ideas of these authors. In particu-
lar, I will defend the view, initially proposed by Kvanvig, according to which the
derivation of the paradox violates a crucial constraint on quantifier instantiation. The
constraint states that non-rigid expressions cannot be substituted into modal posi-
tions. The claim defended will be that knowledge is such a non-rigid expression.
The paradox will therefore be blocked simply because it relies on the substitution
of an epistemic statement in a modal context. We will see how this approach is re-
lated to both Edgington’s and Rabinowicz & Segerberg’s own solution strategies.
Furthermore, we will move from blocking the paradox to proving the consistency of
verificationism with the help of model-theoretical means. We will establish results
concerning the consistency of verificationism and the principle of non-omniscience,
1Kvanvig [9] also voices this opinion.
2Granted, a few assumptions on the epistemic modality are made, but nothing substantial about knowledge
itself. Factivity and distributivity are hardly unique to knowledge.
3There are even supporters of verificationism that subscribe to this view. For example, though Tennant
[15] and Dummett [5] reject the claim that Fitch’s paradox is a problem for intuitionistically minded
verificationism, it is implied that it is a problem for the classical version verificationism that occurs in the
paradox. The same remark applies to Beall [1], but replace intuitionistic by paraconsistent.
4One should also mention Lindstro¨m [10] and Ru¨ckert [12].
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and get a more detailed perspective of the nature of the constraints verificationism
imposes on a “universe” in which it is true.
2 Derivation of the Paradox
In the context of Fitch’s paradox, verificationism, i.e. the thesis according to which
all truths are knowable, is formally expressed as
(Ver) ∀p(p → ♦Kp)
The fact that the thesis involves possible knowledge and not knowledge simpliciter
is crucial to its credibility. Dropping the ‘♦’ in (Ver) will yield an implausible
strengthening of the thesis, namely:
(SVer) ∀p(p → Kp),
which states that all truths are actually known. But it turns out that (SVer) can unfor-
tunately be derived from (Ver) with logical principles that seem, on first inspection,
to be true of knowledge and possibility.
These logical principles can be grouped into three categories according to the no-
tion(s) they pertain to: (i) logical constants proper (i.e. non-modal logical constants),
(ii) the modality of (metaphysical) possibility, or (iii) the epistemic modality. The
first category includes the tautologies of classical logic (plus modus ponens) or, if
one prefers, the rules for intuitionistic logic plus elimination of double negation:
(¬¬) ¬¬φ  φ
Note that this category includes (adapted) propositional versions for quantifier intro-
duction and elimination. Of particular importance to the paradox is the elimination
rule for the universal quantifier, which we will often call the rule of quantifier
instantiation:
(∀ − elim) ∀p φ  φ[ψ/p],
where ‘φ[ψ/p]’ is the formula obtained from ‘φ’ by replacing each occurrence of
‘p’ by ‘ψ’.5 The second category includes the following rule and validity:
(Nec) If  φ, then  φ
(dual→) ¬φ → ¬♦φ
And the third category consists of the validities:
(dist) K(φ ∧ ψ) → (Kφ ∧ Kψ)
(T) Kφ → φ
The modal logical properties in categories (ii) and (iii) are usually taken to be analytic
to the modalities ‘♦’ and ‘K’. In fact, putting (T) aside, these properties are extremely
5Furthermore, we must require that ‘ψ’ be free for ‘p’ in ‘φ’, meaning there is no ‘q’ occurring in ‘ψ’
such that ‘p’ occurs in the scope of a quantifier binding ‘q’ in ‘φ’.
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weak as normal modal logics go and are all valid in the most basic systems. As for
(T), it is unarguably the least controversial property of knowledge.
One of the most general proofs that verificationism collapses into strong verifica-
tionism (cf. [16]) proceeds as follows:
1. q ∧ ¬Kq Hypothesis
2. (q ∧ ¬Kq) → ♦K(q ∧ ¬Kq) 1, (Ver) and ∀-elim (1)
3. ♦K(q ∧ ¬Kq) 1, 2 and →-elim (1)
4. K(q ∧ ¬Kq) Hypothesis
5. Kq ∧ K¬Kq 4, (dist) and →-elim (4)
6. Kq 5, ∧-elim (4)
7. K¬Kq 5, ∧-elim (4)
8. ¬Kq 7, (T) and →-elim (4)
9. ⊥ 6, 8 and ⊥-intro (4)
10. ¬K(q ∧ ¬Kq) 4-9, and ¬-intro
11. ¬K(q ∧ ¬Kq) 10, (Nec)
12. ¬♦K(q ∧ ¬Kq) 11, (dual→) and →-elim
13. ⊥ 3, 12 and ⊥-intro (1)
14. ¬(q ∧ ¬Kq) 1-13, ¬-intro
15. q → ¬¬Kq 14, int. prop. logic
16. q → Kq 15, int. prop. logic and (¬¬)
17. ∀p(p → Kp) 16, ∀-intro
(By “int. prop. logic” at steps 15 and 16, we mean intuitionistic propositional logic.)
Every step of this argument is intuitionistically acceptable except for the transition
from 15 to 16, which requires the classical rule (¬¬). Without (¬¬), we would only
arrive at:
16′. ∀p(p → ¬¬Kp) 15, ∀-intro
The paradox is often presented as the incompatibility of verificationism (Ver) with
the principle of non-omniscience, according to which there are unknown truths. This
principle is formally expressed as
(NO) ∃p(p ∧ ¬Kp)
One can readily verify that (NO) is classically equivalent to the negation of (SVer),
meaning that (Ver) is (classically) inconsistent with (NO).
3 The Wrong Scope Analysis
Central to the paradox is the problematic formula
(1) ♦K(q ∧ ¬Kq),
which occurs at step 3 of the derivation and results from modus ponens and the in-
stantiation of (Ver) by ‘q ∧ ¬Kq’. An informal semantic evaluation of (1) should
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be enough to convince oneself that the formula is pathological: (1) is true at w pro-
vided there is certain world v, accessible from w, where ‘K(q ∧ ¬Kq)’ is true. If
‘q ∧¬Kq’ is known at v then so are the conjuncts, thus ‘q’ is known at v and ‘¬Kq’
is known at v. However, a necessary condition for knowledge is truth, so ‘¬Kq’ is
true at v, and ‘q’ is not known at v, which is contradictory. The problem is that both
occurrences of ‘K’, once in the scope of ‘♦’, end up being interpreted in the same
way, namely as knowledge as it obtains at v. It is certainly no part of verificationism
that one could possibly know and simultaneously not know a proposition. Rather, it
would appear that we lost track of the initial meaning of the second ‘K’ when we
substituted ‘q ∧ ¬Kq’ in (Ver). We can reframe this point in terms of the scope of
‘K’ over ‘♦’ in (1). The idea is that both occurrences of ‘K’ in (1) receive narrow
scope over ‘♦’, i.e. they both are interpreted in the scope of ‘♦’, but to make (1) come
out with the “intended” meaning the second occurrence of ‘K’ should be interpreted
in wide scope. Because of the scope issues involved, I will call this the wrong scope
analysis of Fitch’s paradox, or WS for short. In the following sections, we will ex-
amine different embodiments of the WS analysis and their respective solutions to the
paradox.
3.1 Edgington and Actuality
Edgington [6] is the pioneer of the WS analysis, which she argues for using the tem-
poral analogue of the paradox.6 The temporal analogue to verificationism is obtained
by replacing ‘♦’ in (Ver) by a modality ‘S’, the meaning of which is “at some moment
in time”:
(TVer) ∀p(p → SKp)
Since ‘S’ has the same properties as ‘♦’, (TVer) leads us to the same paradox,
namely that (TVer) entails (SVer). (TVer) expresses the following statement:
(2) If ‘p’ is true at time t0, then there exists a time t1 where ‘Kp’ is true at time t1
If ‘q ∧ ¬Kq’ is true at time t0, we can conclude from (2) that there exists a time t1
such that
(3) ‘K(q ∧ ¬Kq)’ is true at t1
But (3) has two salient interpretations, depending on the time at which the Fitch
conjunction ‘q ∧ ¬Kq’ is considered:
(3.1) It is known at t1 that ‘q ∧ ¬Kq’ is true at t1
(3.2) It is known at t1 that ‘q ∧ ¬Kq’ is true at t0
In (3.1), what is known at t1 is that the Fitch conjunction is true at t1. This is the
meaning (TVer) will have in any standard semantics for modality. But temporal
6This analogue of (Ver) is called the discovery principle by Burgess [3].
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verificationism should lead us to the conclusion (3.2) rather than (3.1), that is, to the
conclusion that what is known at t1 is that the Fitch conjunction is true at t0. So the
claim is that (temporal) verificationism states: if a proposition is true at time t, there
exists a time t ′ at which it is known that the proposition is true at time t (without
the ‘′’). It does not state: if a proposition is true at time t, there exists a future, past or
present time t ′ at which it is known that the proposition is true at time t ′ (with the ‘′’).
We must therefore find a way of providing the occurrence of ‘p’ in the consequent
of (TVer) with the same meaning as the occurrence of ‘p’ in the antecedent, namely
by introducing a device that allows the former occurrence of ‘p’ to have wide scope
over ‘S’.
In order to do so, Edgington introduces a “now” operator ‘N’ such that: ‘Nφ’ iff
‘φ’ is true now. With this new operator, temporal verificationism becomes:
(TVer∗) ∀p(Np → SKNp)
In other words, (TVer*) states that, if ‘p’ is true now, then there exists a time t when it
will be known that ‘p’ is true now (and not necessarily at t). If we instantiate (TVer*)
by a Fitch conjunction ‘q ∧ ¬Kq’, the consequent is of the form ‘SKN(q ∧ ¬Kq)’.
Using this formula instead of ‘SK(q∧¬Kq)’ in the argument template of the paradox
will not allow us to derive (SVer).7
Transposing this analysis to the original case is just a matter of replacing ‘S’ by ‘♦’
and ‘N’ by an actuality operator ‘@’, where the meaning of ‘@’ is given as: ‘@φ’ is
true at w iff ‘φ’ is true in the actual world w0. The result of this transposition would
be the following formalization of verificationism:
(EVer) ∀p(@p → ♦K@p)
This version of verificationism avoids the Fitchean pitfalls for the same reasons as
the temporal version (TVer*).
Promising as it may seem, this solution comes with a considerable downside. As
Edgington herself has noticed, the new actuality operator “trivializes” the modalities
preceding it: in particuliar, the truth value of the statement ‘♦K@p’ at a given world
only depends on the truth value of ‘p’ at the actual world, i.e.
w  ♦K@p iff w0  p
In general, if CONC is an arbitrary concatenation of ‘♦’s and ‘K’s, we have the
similar result that w  CONC@p iff w  @p iff w0  p, provided certain simple
conditions hold.8 This property of ‘@’ seriously undermines the adequacy of (EVer).
The trivialization above can also be explained in an informal manner by consid-
ering more closely the meaning of the statement “ ‘p’ is true in the actual world”. In
the context of modal epistemic logic, I would go as far as to claim knowledge that ‘p’
is true in the actual world is completely independent of knowledge that p. In fact, I
7The statement ‘SK(q ∧ ¬Kq)’ could lead to (SVer) via another argument, but the point is that this can’t
happen with the argument template above.
8The accessibility relations must satisfy: for all w ∈ W , there exists v ∈ W such that R(w, v). This
condition is always satisfied by reflexive accessibility relations.
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would even claim that knowledge of the statement “ ‘p’ is true in the actual world” is
a priori, and that this is the reason ‘@’ trivializes ‘K’. Let me expand on this point.
In possible worlds epistemology, ignorance is ignorance of actuality, or ignorance of
what world is actual. Semantic ignorance, that is, ignorance of the truth conditions
of a statement, is not part of the framework as such, agents are assumed to be se-
mantically omniscient. A similar remark explains why ‘@’ trivializes ‘’. It is either
necessarily the case that p is true at a world w or necessarily the case that it is false
at world w. The fact that p is not the same thing as the fact that ‘p’ is true at world w.
The latter is just a statement about the truth conditions of p, and such semantic facts,
absent a more sophisticated two-dimensional account (cf. [7]), just turn out to be true
in all worlds. Far from being anomalous, this behaviour of ‘@’ is quite normal and
should be expected.
There is a further issue with this solution that has attracted some amount of crit-
icism and to which we must attend before we go on. According to Williamson,
Edgington’s solution is predicated
on the possibility of non-actual knowledge about what is actually the case, and what
could constitute such knowledge remains to be seen. [...] It is hard enough to see what
could constitute even non-actual thought about what is actually the case, let alone
knowledge. ([17]: 257)
I feel there is some unjustified degree of metaphysical skepticism in this reply.
Comparisons between the actual and the possible are fairly common in colloquial
language and usually don’t attract much philosophical attention. Yachts that could
have been longer than they actually are involve, on the face of it, trans-world com-
parisons that could raise the same kind of metaphysical worries, but they usually
don’t. Like knowledge, a possible yacht and the actual yacht inhabit distinct worlds,
but there is some intuition that we can pick them both out in the language and
compare them.
Williamson’s complaint is perhaps more specific than I have made it to be, as he
argues a few lines later that
if people had non-actually had thoughts which they could have expressed by saying
something of the form ‘It is actually the case that p’, they would not have been express-
ing thoughts of the requisite kind, since their use of ‘actually’ would refer rigidly to their
own situation, not to ours. ([17]: 257)
If I understand him correctly, he claims that there is no way the agents in a given
possible but non-actual world could think or say something about the actual world
using the expression “actually”. Although this may be true, I think it is largely unre-
lated to the issue at hand. We, as theorists, are trying to pin down with our language
the proposition that is possibly known by the possible knowers and the claim is that
using an actuality operator is a good way of doing so. Whether or not the possible
agents pick out the same proposition by uttering the same statement is beside the
point. When I say that Bill finds Julie attractive, there is no requirement on Bill that
he know what person is picked out by the name “Julie”. The same, I assume, is true
of possible knowers and the Fitch conjuction.
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3.2 Two-dimensional Semantics and Fitch’s Paradox
Rabinowicz and Segerberg [11] offer a solution to the paradox in line with the WS
analysis. They agree with Edgington on the source of the paradox, and on the fact
that the proper formalization of verificationism is (EVer). Their disagreement with
Edgington lies in the semantics for the modal operators, and especially the meaning
it confers to ‘@’. Their proposal is to interpret these operators in a two-dimensional
semantics, where one dimension accounts for perspective and the other for reference.
The idea is that
a formula φ says something about the reference-world, but what it says is partially de-
termined by the world of perspective. In other words, a formula φ is being interpreted at
a reference-world from a given perspective. ([11]: 104)
Actuality, in particular, will be a perspective dependent notion.
A model in Rabinowicz & Segerberg’s two-dimensional semantics is a structure
of the form 〈W,E,N,, I 〉 where: (i) W is a set of worlds, (ii) E ⊂ (W × W) ×
(W × W) is an epistemic accessibility relation, (iii) N ⊂ W × W a metaphysi-
cal accessibility relation, (iv)  ⊂ ℘(W) a set of admissible propositions, and (v)
I : Prop → ℘(W) an interpretation function. In this semantics, the metaphysical
accessibility relation N depends solely on the reference worlds, but the epistemic
accessibility relation E relates perspective-reference pairs, which means that knowl-
edge is allowed some dependence on perspective. In such a model, a statement’s truth
is inductively defined at a perspective-reference pair in the following manner:
(w, v)  p iff v ∈ I (p)
(w, v)  @φ iff (w,w)  φ
(w, v)  φ iff (w, v′)  φ, for all v′ such that vNv′
(w, v)  Kφ iff (w′, v′)  φ, for all (w′, v′) such that (w, v)E(w′, v′)
The first clause shows us that, at the atomic level, the reference worlds are what
statements are about. Similarly, the third clause makes metaphysical possibility just a
matter of reference worlds. The fact that perspective keeps track of actuality is clear
from the clause for ‘@’. Though the semantics in principle allows E to be any binary
relation on W × W , Rabinowicz and Segerberg choose to add a series of constraints
that reduce E to some sort of triadic relation ε ⊂ W ×W ×W , the intuitive meaning
of which is: εv(w,w′) iff w′ is compatible with what is known in v about w. The
definition of E, as a function of ε, is then given as: (w, v)E(w′, v′) iff (i) v(w,w′)
and v(v, v′) and (ii) if w = v, then w′ = v′. Basically, the world pair (w′, v′) is E-
accessible from (w, v) iff w′ is v-accessible from w and v′ is v-accessible from v +
some condition on centered worlds.
This framework may or may not be the solution to our problems. The difficulty
lies in assessing how well it models the interaction between knowledge and actuality.
According to its authors, it has at least one thing going for it: the semantics for ‘@’ is
non-trivializing, if that is indeed a desired property. One must qualify this statement,
however: it is non-trivializing for ‘K’ but it is trivializing for ‘’. As I explained
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above, contrary to many, I have no qualms with the latter consequence. What puzzles
me is the former. It would seem that ‘@’ does not have wide scope in an epistemic
context, or at least it doesn’t have wide scope with respect to perspective. We can
perhaps make sense of this partial trivialization with an analogy. Consider a language
with non-rigidly denoting terms. One could introduce a rigidifying mechanism in
this language that fixes the meaning of a non-rigid term t to the meaning it has in
a certain world w, so that t rigidified to w has the value it has at w in all worlds.
This rigidifying mechanism blocks the modal variation in the terms but not in other
expressions of the language. Similarly, we might think that ‘@’ blocks the variation
in possible knowledge but not in knowledge itself. Absent a better comprehension of
the semantic clause for ‘K’, this is the best explanation I can come up with.
The whole two-dimensional apparatus is perhaps better understood when applied
to tensed operators.9 The first coordinate now tracks the present time instead of ac-
tuality, and the second the reference time. Tense operators such as “In the past” and
“On Friday” would be evaluated using the reference time coordinate, whereas index-
ical operators such as “Today” and “Tomorrow” would be evaluated with the first
coordinate. This temporal two-dimensional framework would provide them with the
following meanings:
(s, t)  In the past, φ iff ∃t ′ such that t ′ ≺ t and (s, t ′)  φ
(s, t)  On Friday, φ iff (s, t0)  φ
(s, t)  Today,φ iff (s, s)  φ
(s, t)  Tomorrow,φ iff (s, s+)  φ
where s+ is the day after s and where t0 is the designated Friday moment. Without
the two-dimensional framework, “Today” would have the same kind of meaning as
“On Friday”.
The real question is if there is anything in Fitch’s paradox that would justify the
use of a variable notion of actuality? Does the problem with ‘@’ really result from
an unfortunate conflation of “perspectival” and “referential” meanings given to actu-
ality? I find there is lack of evidence for this claim. The impression is strengthened
by the fact that I understand very clearly the application of two-dimensional seman-
tics to the temporal case, but fail to grasp its current application to knowledge and
possibility.
One important aspect I will be retaining from Rabinowicz & Segerberg’s seman-
tics is the idea that the validity of (EVer) can be relativized to a set of propositions
. This will turn out be a crucial element to our model-theoretical analysis of the
paradox. This will supposedly make it a variety of what has been dubbed the restric-
tion strategy, in reference to solutions given by Tennant [15] and Dummett [5] that
block the paradox by limiting the instantiations of (EVer) to formulas of a certain
(syntactic) kind. As we will see, verificationism cannot avoid semantic restriction.
9Another more sophisticated but natural application of the two-dimensional semantic framework is for
the expression of semantic knowledge and contingent a priori truths (cf. [4, 7, 13]). Under the latter
interpretation, the first coordinate is the world in which the meaning of the language is “determined”.
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Another aspect we will be retaining is the idea of a selective rigidification of knowl-
edge. Though this is not obviously a part of their framework, I believe it is what they
were striving to achieve with it.
3.3 Kvanvig and the Indexical Character of Knowledge
The two analyses above are based on the idea that (Ver) is not a proper formaliza-
tion of verificationism, and that a proper formalization should rigidify ‘p’ in (Ver) to
keep the scope of ‘p’ in the antecedent and the scope of ‘p’ in the consequent alined,
thereby blocking any statement of the form (1) from appearing.10 Kvanvig’s [8] di-
agnosis of the paradox involves similar scope issues, but he accepts (Ver) as a proper
formalization of verificationism. This makes the task of solving the paradox slightly
harder, for one must now block the original derivation. As Kvanvig sees it, the prob-
lem is not in the non-rigid behaviour of the possibly known proposition, but rather
in the indexical behaviour of knowledge itself. Knowledge that φ, according to this
analysis, is knowledge that φ by someone and at some moment. Hence, “knowledge
that ...” always involves two implicit quantifiers (on agents and times), quantifiers
that have indexically determined domains. From this, Kvanvig concludes that:
The mistake in the proof occurs with the substitution of an instance of the second as-
sumption [the Fitch conjunction] into the first assumption [(Ver)] as one of the knowable
truths. Since propositions are the objects of knowledge, such a substitution is legitimate
only if the formula expresses the same proposition in the substitutional context that it
expresses in the original context. In the present case, the substitutional context is par-
tially a modal one, for the consequent of the bound conditional in the first assumption is
governed by a possibility operator. ([8]: 495)
This is a problem, for a
[...] substitution to be legitimate, the formula would have to be modally nonindexical.
Otherwise the unknown proposition expressed by that formula in the actual world may
not be the expressed value of that formula in the modal context in question. Since the
substituted formula is a quantified one and quantified sentences are generally modally
indexical, the argument fails because of an illegitimate substitution in a modal context.
([8]: 495)
Glossing over the details, the point is basically that (∀-elim), the rule governing in-
stantiation of a universally quantified formula in a modal language, does not allow
the substitution of indexical expressions (for reasons independent of the paradox),
and that step 2 of the derivation above violates this rule.
In the case of first-order modal logic, instantiation of a universally quantified
modal formula by a non-rigid expression is clearly not truth preserving. To see
why this is so, let ‘P(x)’ be a predicate that picks out a necessary property P .
It is analytic to the nature of a necessary property that an individual instantiating such
10To be perfectly precise, I should say the scope of the formula substituted for ‘p’ in ... rather than the
scope of ‘p’ in ...
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a property necessarily instantiates it.. In other words, we expect the following to be
valid:
(ess) ∀x(P (x) → P(x))
However, if we instantiate (ess) with ‘t’, where ‘t’ is a definite description that picks
out a ∈ P  in the actual world w0 but some b ∈ P  in a possible world w, we
end up with a falsehood. For example, suppose ‘P(x)’ is “x is the biological mother
or father of Neil Armstrong” and ‘t’ the definite description “The man who wed
Viola Louise Engel”.11 Assuming origin essentialism, ‘P(x)’ picks out an essential
property. Since ‘t’ is Stephen Koenig Armstrong in the actual world w0, ‘P(t)’ is
true in w0. Furthermore, suppose that there is a world w where Viola married another
man, so that ‘¬P(t)’ is true in w. Under the assumption that (∀-elim) applies across
the board, we have that w0  P(t). But this contradicts the fact that w  ¬P(t).
The proper reaction to this is not to eliminate (∀-elim) in its entirety but to restrict
the admissible instantiations to terms with rigid denotations (for example, variables
are such rigidly denoting terms).12
Williamson ([18]: 287–9) criticizes this diagnosis on the basis of a misuse of the
term “indexical”. Indexicality sometimes leads to non-rigidity, but not always: “I” is
rigid across possible worlds. Furthermore, non-rigidity is not always the product of
indexicality: definite descriptions are a case in point. This is certainly an important
feature to note about indexicality but I don’t think it invalidates the general idea
behind Kvanvig’s point. As long as knowledge can be determined differently from
one possibility to another—whatever the nature of this determination dependance
may be, non-rigid scope-like problems will arise.
So does the meaning of ‘K’ vary from world to world? It really depends on what
we consider the denotation of ‘K’ at a world to be, but I would be inclined to say yes.
Given a Kripke model M = 〈W,R, I 〉, the meaning of ‘K’ in M at a world w can be
construed as the set or the proposition R[w] = {v ∈ W : R(w, v)}. Moreover, R[w]
can be interpreted as the maximally specific proposition the agent knows at w or, al-
ternatively, as the conjunction of all the propositions she knows at w. The standard
semantic clause for modality can then be re-written as: w  Kφ iff R[w] ⊂ φ,
i.e. ‘φ’ is known at w iff the proposition it defines is a superset of the maximally spe-
cific proposition the agent knows at w. Under any interesting assumptions, R[w] will
vary from one w to another, so the meaning of ‘K’ will be radically non-rigid.
Williamson also questions the claim that non-rigid instantiations are involved in
the paradox at all, since he considers that the sentence name ‘p ∧ ¬Kp’ is rigid
anyways, in some appropriate sense of the term “rigid”. If sentences have rigid de-
notations, then it should be ok to instantiate propositional quantifiers with them,
regardless of the fact that they may contain non-rigid components. In the context
11If wikipedia is to be trusted, she is Neil Armstrong’s mother.
12This point is more frequently made with substitutions than quantifier instantiations. We get the same
problem if we substitute ‘t’ for ‘s’ in ‘F(s)’ if ‘s’ is in the scope of a modality in ‘F’ and ‘s’ is non-rigid.
For example, it is necessarily the case that 8 = 8, but not that the number of planets equals 8. I emphasize
instantiation over substitution because that is what is going on at step 2 of the derivation.
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of Kripke semantics, a sentence denotation is a proposition, i.e. a subset of worlds,
and it can be easily observed that the semantic clauses for the language unambigu-
ously determine a unique proposition for each sentence, one that doesn’t vary from
world to world. Though the truth of the formula ‘φ’ may vary from one world to an-
other, its propositional extension does not. Therefore, the idea is that there should be
no worry at all about instantiations of a propositional quantifier because statements
rigidly denote their propositional extensions.
But this assessment isn’t quite right either, because having propositional quanti-
fiers and sentences that rigidly denote propositions does not circumvent the problem
illustrated above. We make this point with a second-order version of (ess):
(Ess) ∀X∀x(X(x) → X(x))
In keeping with the idea that variables are given wide scope, a semantics for the
second order modal language used in (Ess) would look like this: at a world w and
relative to a variable assignment s,
w, s  X(x) iff s(x) ∈ s(X)
w, s  ∀xφ iff w, t  φ, for all t identical to s except perhaps on x
w, s  ∀Xφ iff w, t  φ, for all t identical to s except perhaps on X
As a result of these wide scope variable assignments, (Ess) will turn out to be valid.
In (Ess), we can understand the quantifier group ‘∀X∀x’ as a special type of a propo-
sitional quantifier, one that quantifies over all propositions of the form “monadic
property plus individual”, i.e. all values of ‘X(x)’. Unrestricted instantiation will
lead to the same problem here that it did with (ess): instantiating the variable group
‘X(x)’ by ‘P(t)’ will lead to the same false consequence as before.13
To reinforce his stance, Kvanvig shows that if verificationism and non-
omniscience are expressed in a language devoid of “modal indexicality”, the deriva-
tion of the paradox cannot go through even if we lift the restrictions on substitutions.
In order to remove the “modally indexical” behaviour of the quantifiers in ‘K’, we
must first make these quantifiers explicit. Kvanvig proposes we use an expression of
the form ‘∃x, tK(x,t)’ instead of ‘K’ to make it clear that knowledge, as it occurs in
verificationism, is knowledge of some agent x at some time t. To simplify, let us as-
sume that we individuate agents by time also,14 so that ‘∃xKx ’ has all the required
generality. The second step is to spell out the appropriate restrictions on the domain
of x to correctly distinguish actual and possible knowledge. The unrestricted domain
of x will be the set of all possible agents, hence the expression ‘∃xKx’ will capture
possible knowledge. Actual knowledge is knowledge by some agent in the actual do-
main of epistemic agents. To express this domain restriction, Kvanvig suggests we
employ an actuality predicate ‘act’ with the following meaning: ‘act(a)’ is true iff
13Kvanvig [9] defends himself against Williamson’s charge by invoking a neo-Russellian semantics of
propositions, not with the present argument.
14By this I mean Tom at noon would be a different epistemic agent as Tom at midnight.
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a is an actual epistemic agent (i.e. belongs to the domain of actual agents). In this
language, verificationism and non-omniscience are captured as thus:
(KVer) ∀p(p → ∃xKxp)
(KNO) ∃p(p ∧ ¬∃x(act(x) ∧ Kxp))
The use of an unrestricted quantifier allows us to dispense with ‘♦’ for the
formulation of verificationism.
One can easily verify that this version of the knowability principle blocks the
derivation of the paradox. The Fitch conjunction at step 1 (i.e. the assumption
for reductio) cannot be of the form ‘q ∧ ¬∃xKxq’, because the negation of this
formula is (KVer). We must assume something of the form ‘q ∧ ¬Kyq’, ‘q ∧
¬(act(y) ∧ Kyq)’ or ‘q ∧ ¬∃y(act(y) ∧ Kyq)’. If we try the first one, we obtain:
1. q ∧ ¬Kyq Hypothesis
2. ∃xKx(q ∧ ¬Kyq) 1, (KVer) and ∀,→-elim (1)
3. Kx(q ∧ ¬Kyq) Hypothesis
4. Kxq ∧ Kx(¬Kyq) 3, (dist) and →-elim (3)
5. Kx(¬Kyq) 4, ∧-elim (3)
6. ¬Kyq 5, (T) and →-elim (3)
7. Kxq 4, ∧-elim (3)
The formulas at step 6 and 7 are not mutually inconsistent. To satisfy 6 and 7, all that
is required is a pair of agents a and b and a proposition π such that a knows π but b
doesn’t. If ‘q’ is assigned the proposition π , ‘x’ the agent a, and ‘y’ the agent b, then
both formulas at 6 and 7 will turn out true. But most importantly this argument will
lead nowhere since the only way to get a Fitch-like contradiction is to have y = x,
and this is a non-starter since it would violate the most basic of all substitution rules:
‘q ∧ ¬Kxq’ is not free for p in (KVer). In other words, you couldn’t substitute this
expression for ‘p’ in (KVer) since ‘x’ already appears in the scope of a quantifier in
(KVer).15
3.4 Brogaard and Salerno on Kvanvig and Indexicality
Like Williamson, Brogaard and Salerno [2] are of the opinion that no illegitimate
substitution in a modal context is involved in the paradox. Their claim is based
on an analysis of how the meanings of expressions are fixed in a context of utter-
ance. Even if Kvanvig’s propositions “contain” world dependent quantifier domains,
this would appear to pose no problem since “the domain of the quantifiers implicit
in the Fitch conjunction are [sic] fixed before it is substituted into the knowabil-
ity principle” (284). Basically, the argument has the following form: (i) Kvanvig’s
substitution restriction is based on the claim that modally indexical expressions re-
ceive their meanings “after” substitution, (ii) modally indexical expressions, like
any other expression, must receive their meanings “beforehand” for the statement
15The other Fitch conjunction proposals will also lead nowhere. In fact, they will be even easier to satisfy:
all we will require is a non-actual agent.
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in which they occur to define a proposition, ergo (iii) there are no illegitimate
substitutions.16
Brogaard & Salerno are right to insist on the fact that terms don’t get their semantic
values sequentially in the course of evaluation, their various denotations must be
fixed in advance for the statement to define a proposition in the first place. Indexical
input occurs only once, at the moment of utterance, not in the course of evaluating
the statement. This is certainly a valid point to direct towards Kvanvig, but it has
little or no traction on the claim that non-rigidity (rather than indexicality) and the
mismanagement of scope are at the root of the paradox. Non-rigidity only requires
shifts in worlds, not contexts.
To illustrate this point, let us consider an example. What proposition is expressed
by the statement
(4) The president could have been a mormon
will obviously depend on the context of utterance. The definite description “The pres-
ident” is certainly not specific enough in itself to understand who it is the utterer is
talking about without any input from the context of utterance. Pronounced during
election night after Obama’s win over Romney, we understand it refers to the current
president of the United States. Moreover, there are two salient scope interpretations
of (3). Under one, “The president” has wide scope over the modal “could”. In this
case, what is being said is that Obama could have been a mormon (which, admittedly,
would be a strange thing to say). Under the other interpretation, the more plausible
one, “The president” has narrow scope over “could”, and what is being said is that it
could have been the case that the person elected was a mormon. The context should
make clear which one of these readings is expressed. However, the shift in denotation
of “The president” in the narrow scope interpretation (i.e. the fact that “The presi-
dent” is Obama in the actual world but Romney in the possible world(s) where the
president elect is mormon) is not due to a context shift or a shift in the values of the
indexical parameters. It is simply due to the non-rigidity of “The president”.
Surprisingly enough, Brogaard & Salerno are only critical of the specific use
Kvanvig makes of indexicality, not of the claim that indexicality is involved in the
paradox, for they believe that “Fitch’s derivation is blocked if we grant the index-
icality of the quantifiers implicit in the Fitch conjunction and in the knowability
principle” (285). Their account of the indexical quantifiers in possible knowledge
is based on Stanley and Szabo’s [13] semantics for quantified noun phrases. This
semantics seeks to account for complex interactions between contextually given
parameters, something they argue is not possible on the traditional account of (struc-
tureless) context. Going into the details of this proposal is beyond the scope of the
present paper, but, from what I understand, Brogaard & Salerno use this semantics to
arrive at something like the following analysis of knowledge:
(5) w  Kφ iff there is an agent a ∈ D(w) such that a knows that φ at w
16I would like to thank an anonymous referee for pointing out Brogaard and Salerno’s [2] paper to me, for
it is highly relevant to the present analysis.
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The crucial part of (5) is the quantifier domain restriction function D, which clearly
makes knowledge vary as a function of worlds. More than just an analysis, Brogaard
& Salerno actually consider ‘K’ to be an abbreviation for the right hand side of (5).
This means that (Ver) is just an abbreviation of
(6) For all propositions p, if it is the case that p at w0, then it is known that p in
some world w by an agent a ∈ D(w)
Similarly, the Fitch conjunction ‘p ∧ ¬Kp’ is just an abbreviation of “p and it is not
the case that it is known that p by an agent a ∈ D(w0)”. So, if we instantiate (6) with
the Fitch conjunction and apply modus ponens, we obtain
(7) It is known in some world w by some agent a ∈ D(w) that: ‘p’ is true and it is
not the case that it is known that p by some agent b ∈ D(w0)
This statement leads in no way to a contradiction since D(w) and D(w0) will in
general be distinct.
Despite the fact that Brogaard & Salerno take themselves to be criticizing
Kvanvig, I fail to see how their solution is significantly different in spirit from the
one he gave and that we analyzed in the previous section (both avoid paradox by
tracking the difference between the actual and non-actual domains of knowers). The
use of Stanley & Szabo’s machinery for quantified noun phrases just adds a level
of complexity to the analysis while accomplishing nothing that Kvanvig’s quantified
modalities didn’t already. Moreover, and most importantly, I fail to see how it consti-
tutes a solution at all. A solution to Fitch’s paradox, first and foremost, must explain
why (SVer) can be derived from (Ver) using seemingly unassailable logical princi-
ples. An explanation might be that (Ver) does not portray verificationism correctly
but that the logical principles are correct (in which case the derivation of (SVer) from
(Ver), being irrelevant to verificationism proper, is of no philosophical interest), or it
might be that (Ver) is correct but that some logical principle is wrong. However, there
is just no way of maintaining that both (Ver) and the logical principles are correct, as
Brogaard & Salerno maintain, while claiming that the paradox is avoided. How can
(Ver) be just an abbreviation of (6) and how can the permissible logical principles
remain unchanged if, on the one hand, we end up with a contradiction in the original
unabbreviated setting but, on the other, with the non-problematic expression in (7)?
This calls for an explanation and I fail to see how this explanation will avoid either
giving up (Ver) or a logical principle in the derivation.
4 A Solution
If it is truly the case that the implicit quantifiers in knowledge are non-rigid, so that
knowledge itself is non-rigid, then Kvanvig’s analysis provides us with a principled
response to the paradox: the derivation is invalid because step 2 involves an ille-
gitimate substitution of a non-rigid modal expression. Some may not feel perfectly
satisfied with this solution, because it would appear to give the impression that the
breadth of (Ver) is compromised: as the language stands, no epistemic formula can
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be substituted for p in (Ver). But this restriction can be lifted if we provide a means
of rigidifying the meaning of ‘K’ so that a Fitch conjunction maintains its wide scope
meaning when substituted in (Ver). We will see how this form of rigidification ma-
chinery differs considerably from those proposed by Edgington and Rabinowicz &
Segerberg.
Blocking a specific derivation of a contradiction from the assumptions (Ver) and
(NO) is not the same thing as proving that these assumptions are consistent. In fact,
for all we know, (Ver) and (NO) could still be inconsistent, even if we restrict (∀-
elim). Proving the consistency of (Ver) and (NO) is uncharted territory as far as the
literature on Fitch’s paradox goes. We will go the further step of proving that there
exist models in which verificationism and non-omniscience are true, thus proving
their mutual consistency. This semantically minded analysis of Fitch’s paradox will
turn out to be fruitful, for it will provide us with bird’s eye view of the constraints
verificationism and non-omniscience place on a structure.
4.1 Rigidifying Epistemic Modalities
As we saw in Section 3.3, we have every reason to believe that the meaning of ‘K’ is
non-rigid. Given the principled restriction on (∀-elim), we could rest content with that
observation and be done with the paradox. However, it would be even more satisfy-
ing, and would give even more substance to the present analysis, if we could provide
a means of rigidifying ‘K’ so as to allow the substitution of epistemic formulas in
(Ver) without any dire consequences.
An expression ‘e’ is non-rigid if its denotation varies from world to world (in
one given context). Definite descriptions are typically non-rigid, for which individual
is picked out by the description, if any, will depend how things are in each world.
Predicates are also typically non-rigid: “is a friend of John” will denote a potentially
different set of individuals in different worlds. Rigidifying an expression ‘e’ with its
value at a world w will be the action of fixing the meaning of ‘e’ at all worlds with
the meaning it has at w. Alternatively, we can think of it as the action of replacing
all occurrences of e by the expression ‘e[w]’ that has the denotation ‘e’ has in w, but
at all worlds, not just w. Our claim is that epistemic modalities are the expressions
in need of rigidification not sentences, as Edgington and Rabinowicz & Segerberg
contended.
To rigidify ‘K’, we must first establish what we mean by ‘K’. In the previous sec-
tion, we examined analyses both by Kvanvig and by Brogaard & Salerno according to
which the meaning of ‘K’ is given in terms of quantification over a world-dependent
domain of agents. This lead to the following truth conditions:
(5) w  Kφ iff there exists a ∈ D(w) such that a[w] ⊂ φ,
where a[w] = {v ∈ W : a(w, v)} is, as we previously saw, the maximally specific
proposition known by a. This characterization of the meaning of ‘K’ depends on
w in two crucial ways: first, for the domain restriction D(w), and second, for the
proposition a[w]. Since the domain of knowers is pretty much the defining aspect
of knowledge at a world, our rigidifying will focus on that aspect. For every world
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w ∈ W , ‘K[w]’ will be the modality that stands for knowledge as it obtains at w, and
its meaning is given as follows:
(8) v  K[w]φ iff there exists a ∈ D(w) such that a[v] ⊂ φ
Note that the domain is fixed at D(w) and no longer varies as a function of the world
of evaluation v.
A Fitch conjunction of the form ‘p ∧ ¬K[w]p’ has no non-rigid component ex-
pressions, so substitution in (Ver) is allowable by (∀-elim). Let us walk through an
evaluation of this formula in a verificationist model. Suppose that v  p ∧¬K[w]p.
Since (Ver) is true at v, we obtain that u  K(p ∧¬K[w]p), for some u (metaphysi-
cally) accessible from v, which in turn is equivalent to u  K[u](p ∧¬K[w]p). The
assumption that‘K[u](p∧¬K[w]p)’ is true at u is in no way contradictory. Further-
more, the truth conditions of ‘K[u](p ∧ ¬K[w]p)’ faithfully express the intended
meaning of (Ver).
4.2 On Verificationist Models
We have argued that establishing the non-rigidity of ‘K’ was enough to block the
paradox, and rigidifying ‘K’ was only a auxiliary device to vindicate the analysis. De-
spite this, we have no assurance that (Ver) and (NO) are mutually consistent, just that
a special derivation doesn’t lead to contradiction. Here is where the new programme
begins. What we are now seeking is a proof that (Ver) and (NO) are consistent (rela-
tive to some respectable logic), which we will do by providing a model for both (Ver)
and (NO).
A model M of the language described above will be a structure of the form
〈W,D,R,〉 where: (i) W is a set of possible worlds; (ii) D is a function that assigns
to each world w a domain of knowers D(w) at that world, and each a ∈ D(w) is (or
determines) an epistemic accessibility on W; (iii) R is a metaphysical accessibility
relation on W; and (iv)  is a subset of ℘(W), i.e. the set of admissible propositions.
We will say that M is verificationist at w if the formulas (Ver) and (NO) are both
true at w, and verificationist (simpliciter) if it is verificationist at all worlds. Our task
is to determine under what conditions such models exist, if they exists at all.
The astute reader will have noticed that there is a built-in restriction on proposi-
tions in the model M, an idea we borrowed from Rabinowicz and Segerberg. One
might wonder why it is necessary to restrict the domain of propositions in this way,
why we couldn’t allow all subsets of W to be propositions. The reason is simple:
if we allow any subset to be a proposition in M, then M cannot be verification-
ist. In fact, it is even worse than that: if M has a singleton proposition {w} in its
propositional domain, then it can’t be verificationist at w (and therefore can’t be veri-
ficationist simpliciter). A singleton proposition is the most specific proposition there
is. If an agent knows proposition {w} at w, there is simply no proposition true at w
that she can ignore, violating (NO). If we want to say anything meaningful about
verificationist models, we must therefore restrict the domain of the propositional
quantifiers.
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Another thing we can observe is the conflicting nature of the constraints (Ver)
and (NO) place on a model. In a way, (Ver) entails that the more propositions there
are in  the more worlds the model will require at which these propositions are
known; on the other hand, (NO) entails that the more worlds there are in W the more
propositions we will need in  to be ignored at these worlds. This should make it
clear the existence of verificationist models will most certainly depend on  (and in
fact they do).
Given this dependence, the following characterizations of the propositional do-
main will be useful. We say that  is the total domain if  = ℘(W), i.e. if all
propositions are admissible; that  is closed on complementation if W\π ∈ ,
whenever π ∈ ; that  is closed on intersection if π∩π ′ ∈ , whenever π, π ′ ∈ ;
that  is Boolean iff it is closed on complementation and intersection; and that  is
epistemically closed iff  is Boolean and if κ(w, π) ∈ , for all w ∈ W and π ∈ ,
where
κ(w, π) = {v ∈ W : a[v] ⊂ π, for some a ∈ D(w)}.
(The proposition κ(w, π) consists of the worlds v where π is known with knowl-
edge as it is in w.) If  is epistemically closed, then it contains, more or less, every
proposition definable without propositional quantifiers, non-rigid ‘K’ or ‘♦’.
Our main result gives us an overall picture of the prospects for verificationist
models.
Theorem 4.1 In what follows, M is a model of the form 〈W,D,R,〉. We have:
(a) If {w} ∈ , then M cannot be verificationist at w, and therefore cannot be
verificationist. In particular, if  is the total domain, it follows that M can’t be
verificationist at any w.
(b) There exists a verificationist model M such that W is finite and  is closed on
complementation.
(c) If M is verificationist and  is Boolean, then W and  are infinite. In other
words, there are no finite Boolean verificationist models.
(d) There exists a verificationist model M such that  is epistemically closed.
Proof See Appendix.
Part (a) and (d) answer the question of the consistency of (NO) and (Ver), which
is: it depends. Part (a) shows that full blooded verificationism is out of bounds. The
resolutely anti-verificationist may choose to focus on that aspect of the theorem to
vindicate his stance. But we must stress the fact that the impossibility stated in (a) has
nothing to do with Fitch’s paradox, because the statement ‘q ∧¬Kq’ (in the original
syntax) does not define a singleton proposition in general. Since Fitch’s paradox
relies only on general assumptions about ‘K’ and that many of these assumptions
are consistent with ‘q ∧ ¬Kq’ defining non-singleton propositions, the derivation
cannot be the product of what semantically would translate to an issue about singleton
propositions.
Parts (b) and (c) establish lower bounds on a verificationist universe. The
price of finitism for the verificationist is quite high: (s)he must abandon closure on
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conjunction, which does not seem like a very plausible position to defend. It is not
clear who this affects exactly, but it could certainly be argued that certain forms of
anti-realism—strict finitism comes to mind—entertain the idea that there is only a
finite number of possible propositional meanings. I believe this is perhaps the most
striking of the results in this theorem, that verificationism entails a flight to infinity.
A moderate verificationist could very well find solace in part (d). This model has
a considerable propositional domain, one sufficient to think that (NO) and (Ver) are
mutually consistent in more than fringe or degenerate universes. It is currently un-
known if (NO) and (Ver) could be made consistent in a model where the propositional
domain consists of those propositions definable without non-rigid ‘K’ (or perhaps
without non-rigid ‘K’ or ‘♦’). This would represent a sizeable victory for verifica-
tionism if it turned out to be true. A verificationist could very plausibly argue that
“full” verificationism was never the claim in the first place, but only verificationism
for all propositions nameable or survey-able by the language.
Part (d) also allows us to establish an important difference between this solution
strategy and the so-called restriction strategies. Restriction strategies, as the name
would suggest, call for a principled syntactic restriction on what statements can be
substituted for ‘p’ in (Ver). The approach is as good as the restricting condition. For
example, one could just issue a decree stating that no formula containing ‘K’ can be
fed into (Ver). This would block the paradox, but only at the price of being utterly
and totally ad hoc. All restriction strategies will want as a result of the restricting
condition that statements of the form ‘q ∧ ¬Kq’ are not permitted in (Ver). I want
to stress the fact that part (d) of the theorem shows us that the present solution is not
a semantically disguised restriction strategy. If  is epistemically closed, then there
are propositions π ∈  such that π = q ∧ ¬K[w]q, for every world w ∈ W and
propositional constant q. If there were a contradiction obtainable by substitution of
‘q ∧ ¬K[w]q’ in (Ver), restricting to an epistemically closed propositional domain
like  could not have blocked it. Hence, though one may be tempted to assimilate this
approach to a restrictive strategy, this part of the theorem clearly shows that it isn’t.
A last remark about this theorem regarding consistency. Consistency is relative to a
logic. The weaker the logic, the “easier” it is for statements to be mutually consistent,
i.e. two statements φ1 and φ2 could be mutually consistent relative to logic 
1 but
inconsistent relative to logic 
2 stronger than 
1. As we mentioned in the opening
section of this paper, if we retreat to intuitionistic logic, (Ver) entails a statement
which is only classically equivalent to strong verificationism. It would thus appear
that (NO) and (Ver) are consistent relative to intuitionistic logic. Furthermore, if K
isn’t factive and doesn’t distribute over ‘→’ then, once again, both (NO) and (Ver)
appear to be mutually consistent. One of the frustrating features of many solutions to
the paradox is that the addition of one or more reasonable assumptions often leads to
a comeback of the paradox. This would lead one to conclude that the solution isn’t
stable or definite in nature. Adding an assumption amounts to strengthening the logic,
so the stronger the logic relative to which both (Ver) and (NO) are consistent the less
likely the Fitchean comeback.
So what logic does the model constructed in the proof of (d) obey? The model
satisfies classical logic (both on the level of Boolean connectives and on the level
of quantifiers) and the metaphysical accessibility relation satisfies (S5). As for the
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epistemic modality ‘K’, it does satisfy (4) and (5), as well as factivity, but it won’t
satisfy normality:
(K) K(φ → ψ) → (Kφ → Kψ)
This is essentially due to the existential quantifier in the clause for ‘K’. As it stands,
one agent a could know that φ → ψ without knowing that φ, and another agent b
could know that φ without knowing that φ → ψ , despite the fact that their “com-
bined” knowledge would know that ψ . If there are no other agents, this will make the
first two antecedents of (K) true but make the embedded consequent false. To avoid
this situation, it suffices to slightly modify the clause for knowledge in the following
manner. Define the combined knower at w to be the agent with the epistemic acces-
sibility relation aw = ⋂a∈D(w) a. The relation aw is just the combined knowledge of
all the agents at w. Then replace (5) by
(5.1) w  Kφ iff aw[w] ⊂ φ
The meanings of (Ver) and (NO) aren’t affected by this slight change and the modi-
fications we must make to the model in part (d) are minimal. The upshot is that ‘K’
is now a (S5) modality also. As far as modal logics go, this is as strong as they get.
The possibility of a Fitchean comeback is therefore very unlikely.
5 Concluding Remarks
Fitch’s paradox is not a sound argument against verificationism. Endorsing Kvanvig’s
analysis, I have argued that the derivation of the paradox relies on an unlicensed
instantiation, where the term “unlicensed” is not tied to verificationism in any way
but only to the general behaviour of quantifiers in a modal setting. This does not keep
verificationism from having “structural” limits or constraints though, as parts (a)-(c)
of theorems 4.1 show, but they are much more limited in scope than what Williamson
and others have claimed. Where verificationism breaks down (as a function of the
propositional domain) is not yet clear, but part (d) establishes that it is defendable at
least in non-trivial “universes”.
Content with having cleared verificationism of its accusations of inconsistency, I
leave to others the task of judging how well it fares against the backdrop of a stronger
ideology.
Appendix A: Proof of Main Result
(a) Suppose that the extension of p is {w}, then w  p. By (Ver), there exists v such
that R(w, v) and v  Kp. Since p is only true at w, v = w. Moreover, w  Kp
iff there exists a ∈ D(w) such that a[w] ⊂ {w}. Since w ∈ a[w], by factivity,
this means a[w] = {w}. But then every proposition true at w will be known at
w, contradicting (NO). The second part follows immediately.
(b) Let W = {w, x, y, z}. Define a as the reflexive, symmetric and transitive clo-
sure of {(w, x), (y, z)} and b as the reflexive, symmetric and transitive closure
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of {(w, y), (x, z)}. Let D(w) = D(z) = {a} and D(x) = D(y) = {b}. Let S be
the total binary relation on W, and  the set {{w, x}, {y, z}, {w, y}, {x, z}}.
 is clearly closed under complementation, and we can easily verify that
(Ver) and (NO) are true in each world (consider each possible case separately).
For example, only the propositions π1 = {w, x} and π2 = {w, y} are true at w.
π1 is known and π2 is unknown at w, but π2 is known at y, a world accessible
from w. The other cases are verified in a similar fashion.
(c) To show this part we apply (Ver) and (NO) alternatively. Let w0 ∈ W be any
world. By (NO), there exists a proposition π0 ∈  that is unknown at w0, i.e. for
every knower a ∈ D(w0), a[w0] ⊂ π0. By (Ver), there exists w1, accessible
from w0 via R, such that π0 is known at w1, i.e. there exists a1 ∈ D(w1) with
a1[w1] ⊂ π0. Clearly, w1 is distinct from w0. By (NO), there exists π1 ∈ 
such that π1 is unknown at w1. The proposition π0∩π1 is also true and unknown
at w1, so in particular π0∩π1 is distinct from π0. By (Ver), there therefore exists
w2 such that π0∩π1 is known at w2. Since both π0 and π1 are known at w2, w2 is
distinct from both w0 and w1. By (NO), there exists π2 ∈  such that is true but
unknown at w2. And so on and so forth. We can therefore generate an infinite
sequence of distinct worlds wn and propositions πn such that the propositions
π0, π1, ..., πk−1 are known at wk but not the proposition πk . It follows then that
W and  are infinite.
(d) We define a model M = 〈W,D,R,〉 with the desired properties. Let W =
Z×N. For each n ∈ N, let cn be the relation of congruence modulo 2n: cn(x, y)
iff x − y is divisible by 2n. We define an as the binary relation on W such that:
an(w, v) iff w2 = v2 and cn(w1, v1), where w = (w1, w2) and v = (v1, v2).
For w = (w1, w2), let D(w) = {an : n ≤ w2}. We let R be the total binary
relation on W (other choices will do also). Finally,  is defined as the set of
π ⊂ W such that π = π0 × N and π0 is of the form:
(∗) π0 = cn[k1] ∪ cn[k2] ∪ ... ∪ cn[km],
where n > 0 and k1, k2, ..., km are such that 0 ≤ k1 < ... < km < 2n (with m
possibly zero, in which case π = ∅).17 In other words, π0 is a (possibly empty)
union of equivalences classes.
 is closed under complementation because the complement of a (possibly
empty) union of equivalence classes is also a (possibly empty) union of equiv-
alence classes (of the same relation).  is also closed under intersection. To
show this, first observe that if
π0 = cn[k1] ∪ cn[k2] ∪ ... ∪ cn[km]
π ′0 = cn′ [l1] ∪ cn′ [l2] ∪ ... ∪ cn′ [lm′ ] (A1)
with 0 ≤ k1 < k2 ... km < 2n and 0 ≤ l1 < l2 ... lm′ < 2n′ (m,m′ pos-
sibly zero), then there exists a similar decomposition for π0 and π ′0 with the
equivalence classes of the relation cn′′ , for any n′′ ≥ max(n′, n). This follows
17c[k] is the equivalence class of k modulo the relation c.
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from the fact that 2n′′ is a (common) multiple of 2n and 2n′ , and therefore ev-
ery equivalence class of cn or cn′ is the union of equivalence classes of cn′′ . If
π0 is a disjoint union of equivalence classes of the relation cn′′ and the same is
true of π0′ , then their intersection is a disjoint union of the classes they have in
common. Hence,  is Boolean.
Let us show now that  is epistemically closed. We show this by induction
on the number of connectives in φ. If there are none, the result is a consequence
of the definition of an the interpretation function. For the induction step, we
proceed by considering the main connective of φ. The Boolean cases follow by
the induction hypothesis and the arguments of the preceding paragraph. We are
left with the case where φ is of the form K[w]ψ , for some w = (w1, w2) ∈ W .
Suppose v = (v1, v2) ∈ W . By definition, we have that v  K[w]ψ
iff there exists a ∈ D(w) such that a[v] ⊂ ψ
iff aw2[v] ⊂ ψ
iff cw2[v1] × {v2} ⊂ ψ
iff cw2[v1] ⊂ cn[k1] ∪ cn[k2] ∪ ... ∪ cn[km]
Since cw2 is an equivalence relation, cw2[v1] = cw2[m] for any m ∈ Z such that
cw2(v1, m), so that
K[w]ψ =
(⋃
{cw2[m] : m ∈ Z such that cw2[m] ⊂ ψ}
)
× N.
The proposition defined by ‘K[w]ψ’ is therefore in .
We must now show that (Ver) and (NO) are true everywhere in the model.
Let us start by (Ver). Let π = π0 × N be a true proposition at w = (w1, w2).
There exists a minimal n such that π0 admits a decomposition like (*) above.
Since the equivalence classes of (*) are disjoint and π is true at w, there exists
a unique class containing w1, the class cn[w1]. Since the proposition π is a
consequence of the proposition cn[w1] × N, i.e. cn[w1] × N ⊂ π , it suffices to
know cn[w1]×N in order to know π . By definition of the relations cm, it is clear
that cm[w1] ⊂ cn[w1] whenever m ≥ n. Hence, for any m ≥ n, am[w1] ⊂ π so
that π is known at (w1, m).
To show (NO), for all w ∈ W , we must show there is a proposition that is
true but unknown at w. If w = (w1, w2), then aw2 is the most knowledgeable
knower at w. By definition of , π = cw2+1[w1] × N is a proposition and we
have that cw2[w1] ⊂ cw2+1[w1], so that π is not known by aw2 . Since aw2 is the
most knowledgeable knower at w, this proves the result.
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